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Abstract 
Threat relates to right-wing ideological attitudes at the individual level. The present 
study aims to extend this relationship to the national level. More specifically, in a sample of 
91 nations, we collected country-level indicators of threat (including inflation, 
unemployment, gross national product, homicide rate, and life expectancy). Moreover, we 
analyzed data from the European and World Value Survey (total N = 134,516) to obtain 
aggregated country-level indicators for social-cultural and economic-hierarchical right-wing 
attitudes for each of these countries. In accordance with previous findings based on the 
individual level, a positive relationship between threat indicators and right-wing attitudes 
emerged. This relationship was stronger than what was usually reported at the individual 
level. In the discussion, we focus on the mutually reinforcing influence at the individual and 
national levels in terms of right-wing attitudes. 
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The hypothesis that threat relates to right-wing attitudes has been confirmed in many 
political psychological studies over the years using several right-wing ideological attitudes, 
including authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and conservatism (for meta-analytic 
overviews, see Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Onraet, Van Hiel, Dhont, & 
Pattyn, 2011). In these studies, threat has been rather diversely operationalized, mostly 
focusing on subjective perceptions. When being exposed to the same threatening situations or 
events, individuals greatly differ in the extent to which they experience these threats; some of 
these individuals are hardly affected, whereas others are paralyzed by anxiety. Studies of 
subjective threat revealed that perceiving the world as a dangerous place with low levels of 
social cohesion, high levels of perceived terroristic threat and problematic economic or 
political situations, as well as the experience of threat posed by the presence of outgroups, is 
associated with higher levels of right-wing attitudes (for example, Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt & 
Sibley, 2009). However, despite the advantages of investigating these subjective threat 
perceptions, which allow to tap into the private views of individuals, the validity of these 
studies might be at risk because of self-report and response biases.  
A number of studies have also presented evidence for the effects of threatening 
situations on right-wing attitudes (e.g., Doty, Peterson, & Winter, 1991; McCann, 1997; 
Winter, 1996). As an example, following the September 11
th
, 2001 terrorist attacks, 
individuals who were close to the World Trade Center at the moment of the attacks moved 
toward political conservatism (Bonanno & Jost, 2006). Similar results were obtained in Spain 
after the Madrid attacks in March 2004 (Echebarria-Echabe, & Fernández-Guede, 2006). 
Finally, some studies have investigated situational indicators of threat, typically using 
“objective” measures based on statistical indicators, such as income, unemployment and 
crime rate. These studies also yielded corroborative evidence for the positive relationship 
between threat and right-wing attitudes. As an example, on the basis of archival data, Sales 
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(1972, 1973) reported higher conversion rates to authoritarian churches and increased 
manifestations of authoritarianism (such as increased budgets for police) during a period of 
high threat, as compared with a period when threat levels were low. Changes in societal threat 
(including economic, social, and political threat) thus increase right-wing attitudes (see Doty 
et al., 1991; McCann, 1997). 
Towards a two-dimensional representation of right-wing attitudes 
 A comprehensive view of right-wing attitudes requires the differentiation between the 
social-cultural and economic-hierarchical domains (see, Duckitt, 2001; Middendorp, 1978). In 
the social-cultural domain, progressive, left-wing attitudes refer to the freedom to arrange life 
according to one's own insights, whereas right-wing ideology reflects adherence to traditional 
values and norms. Cultural right-wing attitudes thus favor authoritarian parent-child 
relationships, traditional work ethics, and conventional female roles (see, Middendorp, 1978). 
This dimension typically has been labeled cultural or social conservatism, authoritarianism 
and traditionalism at one pole, versus openness, autonomy, liberalism, or personal freedom at 
the other pole.  
 From an economic-hierarchical perspective, left-wing attitudes emphasize equality of 
the distribution of power, income, and opportunities (see, Middendorp, 1978). Economic 
right-wing attitudes refer to adherence to capitalist ideology, private initiative and unrestricted 
competition among individuals. This dimension has been labeled as economic conservative 
beliefs, social dominance orientation, belief in hierarchy or inequality at one pole versus 
egalitarianism, humanitarianism, social welfare, or concern at the other pole (Duckitt, 2001). 
 Whereas initially right-wing attitudes were considered the expression of a deeply 
ingrained personality dimension (e.g., Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1998),  recent research 
showed that right-wing attitudes should instead be considered as generalized attitudes and 
beliefs of a broadly ideological nature (e.g., Duckitt, 2001). Moreover, it is believed that this 
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set of attitudes can change over time and across social contexts. Most notably, social threat is 
reported to impact upon right-wing attitudes (e.g.  Doty et al., 1991; Duckitt, 2001; Stenner, 
2005). 
Trait variables at the national level 
 There has been a long interest in the national level analysis of psychological constructs 
reflected in studies of cross-national differences in, for example, personal values (e.g., 
Buchanan & Cantril, 1953). More recent research has examined cross-national differences in 
mean-level scores on personality traits and particularly on the cross-national variation in the 
prevalence of the traits included in the Five-Factor Model of personality (e.g., McCrae, 
Terracciano, & 79 Members of the Personality Profiles of Culture Project, 2005). Moreover, 
the utility of the national character has been amply demonstrated, such that the national Five-
Factor Model dimensions have been reported to strongly relate to, for example, health 
outcomes and mortality (e.g., Bogg & Roberts, 2004). 
 There has also been a long interest in the national level analysis of political 
psychological traits. This interest is exemplified by Inglehart (1990), who has shown that a 
country’s economic growth and prosperity shifts incumbents’ attitudes in the direction of 
postmaterialism. The work of Fromm (1941) on the national character of fascist prone 
countries versus democratic ones represents an early treatment of national character, although 
this author did not present empirical data on the matter. Despite the attention on the 
relationship between threat and right-wing attitudes, however, previous studies have neglected 
to study the relationship between threat and cross-national level data of right-wing attitudes.  
The present study  
 In the present study, we aimed to extend the hypothesis that threat is associated with 
heightened levels of social-cultural and economic-hierarchical right-wing attitudes at the 
national level. In the present study, we examined whether country-level indicators of threat 
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are related with mean levels of inhabitants’ right-wing attitudes. In line with previous studies 
on the individual level (see, Jost et al., 2003; Onraet et al., 2011), as well as with the few 
studies that established within-nation longitudinal effects (e.g., Doty et al., 1991; McCann, 
1997; Sales, 1972, 1973), we expected to find a positive relationship between country-level 
threats and national levels of right-wing attitudes. This research question was investigated by 
including countries from all over the world, which extends previous studies that almost 
exclusively included highly developed, democratic societies.  
We selected threat indicators based on previous archival studies investigating the 
relationship between threat and authoritarianism at the national level (Sales, 1973; Doty et al., 
1991). Moreover, the worldwide availability of data of these indicators was another necessary 
condition. As a result, we selected five threat indicators: inflation rate, unemployment rate, 
Gross Domestic Product, homicide rate, and life expectancy. This selection included diverse 
types of threat, such as economic threat and direct threat to one’s life (see also Sales, 1973; 
Doty et al., 1991). Data of these indicators for each country were retrieved from reliable data 
sources, such as the CIA World Fact Book and the United Nations. 
 National levels of right-wing attitudes were computed on the basis of items from the 
WVS (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/) and the EVS 
(http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/). Both surveys are administered in representative 
samples and use practically identical questionnaires and methodologies. We selected items 
tapping into social-cultural and economic-hierarchical right-wing attitudes (Duckitt, 2001; 
Middendorp, 1978). Country-level indicators were obtained by calculating the mean score for 
each item. 
Method 
Country sample  
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We analyzed data from 91 countries: 42 European, 2 North American, 11 South 
American, 20 Asian, 14 African, and 2 countries in the Australian region. The choice of 
countries was determined by data availability. 
Country level threat indicators  
In each country, the national threat measures were taken from the year before the 
corresponding EVS/WVS wave. Using the CIA World Factbook 
(https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/), we obtained measures for 
inflation rate (consumer price index), unemployment rate, Gross Domestic Product (per 
capita), and life expectancy. Furthermore, a measure for homicide rate (per 100,000 
individuals in a given population) was taken from the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime Website (UNODC, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/). Because these indicators were not 
available for each country at the time period being studied, we established several rules to fill 
in these missing values. First, we looked for data from a nearby year. If these data were not 
available, we computed the mean score of the indicator for all neighboring countries and 
assigned this value to the target country. If computing this mean score was not possible, we 
computed the mean score of all available countries within that continent.  
Country-level indicators for right-wing attitudes 
We used the last available wave of the EVS (2008, 36 countries included) and WVS 
(2005, 39 countries included) as a starting point. To obtain additional countries, we also 
included 16 countries included in the 2000 WVS wave. In these surveys, two items were 
closely related to the construct of social-cultural right-wing attitudes. First, obedience as a 
child-rearing value was measured by giving participants a list of qualities which children can 
be encouraged to learn at home. Participants indicated which qualities they found especially 
important. The response was coded as 1 corresponding to “not mentioned” and 2 
corresponding to “mentioned” (overall M = 1.39, SD = .19). Second, respect for authority was 
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measured using the question, “Do you think if there would be greater respect for authority in 
the near future, it would be a good thing or a bad thing?” The response was coded with 1 for 
“a bad thing” and 2 for “a good thing” (overall M = 1.83, SD = .18). 
Two items tapped the construct of economic-hierarchical attitudes. First, preference 
for income inequality was measured by agreement with the statement “Incomes should be 
equal” versus “There should be greater incentives for individual effort.” Answers were given 
on a 10 point Likert scale with 1 corresponding to full agreement with the first opinion and 10 
to full agreement with the second opinion (overall M = 5.81, SD = 1.11). Similarly, attitudes 
towards competition was measured by agreement with the statement, “Competition is 
harmful. It brings out the worst in people” versus “Competition is good. It stimulates people 
to work hard and develop new ideas” (overall M = 6.20, SD = .69). 
Results 
First, we computed the correlations among the study’s variables (see Table 1). Most 
importantly, national threat was significantly related with the aggregated scores on several 
items of right-wing attitudes (i.e., 17 out of 20 correlations were significant, rs > .23).  
Next, structural equation modeling (SEM) with latent variables was performed using 
Lisrel 8.71 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2004). SEM has several advantages over zero-order 
correlations; most noticeably, SEM enables one to model latent variables while taking into 
account the unreliability of the indicators. Figure 1 represents the model of the relationships 
between threat and right-wing attitudes
1
. The goodness-of-fit of this model was assessed 
using the chi-square test, the comparative fit index (CFI), the root-mean-square error of 
approximation (RSMEA), and the standardized root-mean-square residual (SRMR). 
Following standard recommendations, a satisfactory fit is indicated by: chi-square values 
lower than double the degrees of freedom, CFI values greater than .95, RMSEA values of less 
                                                          
1
 The extraction of one principal component from the five threat indicators revealed high loadings of all 
indicators (all loadings ≥ .70), explaining 59.55% of the variance.  The threat indicators thus seem to be 
adequately represented by a single dimension. 
9 
 
 
than .06, and SRMR values of less than .08 (Hu & Bentler, 1999). The model indices 
reflected a good fit (N = 91; χ2 = 29.11, df = 24, RMSEA = .05, SRMR = .05, CFI = .99). 
Additionally, as can be seen in Figure 1, highly significant paths between the latent variables 
emerged. These paths between the latent constructs were often stronger than the loadings of 
the indicators on their latent constructs. Hence, to establish whether we can indeed 
empirically distinguish between the latent constructs, we compared the fit of the model 
depicted in Figure 1 with the fit of several models that constrained the correlation between 
two latent constructs to 1 (for example, testing the fit of a model where the correlation 
between economic-hierarchical attitudes and threat is set to 1). The fit of all these constrained 
models was significantly worse (Δχ2’s > 12.98, ps <.001), suggesting that threat, social-
cultural attitudes, and economic-hierarchical attitudes represent separate, but strongly related, 
latent constructs.
2
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
To further clarify the obtained associations between threat and right-wing attitudes, 
Figures 2a and 2b depict the scores of all countries related to threat (on the X-axis) and social-
cultural (Figure 2a) and economic-hierarchical (Figure 2b) right-wing attitudes (on the Y-
axis). From these Figures, it can be easily inferred that countries with high levels of threat are 
more likely to have high levels of right-wing attitudes. Figure 3a and 3b depict levels of 
social-cultural and economic-hierarchical right-wing attitudes on a world map. To obtain a 
classification for right-wing attitudes, we divided the countries into five categories for both 
social-cultural and economic-hierarchical right-wing attitudes using the 20
th
, 40
th
, 60
th
 and 
                                                          
2 
A model with the 4 single indicators as manifest variables instead of two latent variables of social-cultural and 
economic-hierarchical attitudes did not show significant better fit (Δχ2 = 0.6). Furthermore, it was revealed that 
the strength of the paths between the threat latent variable and the single indicators of attitudes remained strongly 
positive, corroborating our previous findings (the path coefficients were .65, .36, .34, and .36 for the relationship 
of threat with obedience, authority, incomes, and competition, respectively). 
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80
th
 percentiles of these variables. As can be seen in all Figures, countries situated in Africa 
show the highest levels of right-wing attitudes.  
Insert Figures 2a and 2b about here 
Insert Figures 3a and 3b about here 
Finally, we tested for potential exponential relationships between threat and right-wing 
attitudes using curve estimation on the basis of the latent scores. Specifically, in countries 
under very high threat, levels of right-wing attitudes might be disproportionally high. Indeed, 
historical events illustrate that the collective mind is remarkably efficient in absorbing right-
wing authoritarian ideas when confronted with extremely high levels of threat (e.g. the rise of 
Hitler). It was revealed that the exponential relationship was significant for both social-
cultural right-wing attitudes, F (1, 89) = 20.30, p < .001, and economic-hierarchical right-
wing attitudes, F (1, 89) = 10.52, p < .01. These results indicate that with high levels of threat, 
the increase in right-wing attitudes is especially pronounced (see Figures 2a and 2b).  
 Discussion 
The main aim of the present study was to examine the relationship between threat and 
right-wing attitudes at the national level. Therefore, we investigated national threat indicators 
based on statistical data, as well as aggregated scores on social-cultural and economic-
hierarchical right-wing attitudes. We were able to show that the level of threat in a country is 
positively related to the national level of right-wing attitudes. More specifically, countries 
under high levels of threat are more inclined to have overall higher levels of social-cultural 
and economic-hierarchical right-wing attitudes than countries under low threat levels. These 
findings attest to the strength of the macro social context to elicit an attitudinal shift in the 
right-wing direction of the entire population. Our results corroborate psychological theories 
considering threat as an important correlate of authoritarianism (see, Jost et al., 2003; Onraet 
et al., 2011), as well as studies reporting strong relationships between situational threat and 
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right-wing attitudes within nations (e.g., Doty et al., 1991; Sales, 1972, 1973). The magnitude 
of the relationship between threat and national right-wing attitudes was impressive, with 
standardized path coefficients of .70 and .79. This relationship is much stronger than previous 
findings reported at the individual level. Indeed, based on meta-analytic integrations of 
studies (Jost et al., 2003; Onraet et al., 2011), the relationship between threat and right-wing 
attitudes at the individual level has been reported to be in the range of .25-.50. It should be 
noted that these very strong effect sizes cannot be attributed to shared method variance, since 
the national level right-wing attitudes are based on self-report measures, while the national 
threat indicators are based on statistical indicators such as unemployment rate. A possible 
explanation for this stronger relationship of national data is the principle of aggregation, 
which typically occurs because reduced measurement error produces a highly stable and 
reliable assessment (see, Epstein, 1986; Steel & Ones, 2002). Hence, when two variables are 
similarly related at the individual and national levels of analysis, the observed correlations at 
the national level may be expected to be higher than those found at the individual level.  
However, it is important to note that individual-level relationships do not always 
replicate at higher levels of analysis. For example, it is possible that relationships on the 
individual and national level show reversed signs, suggesting that different processes operate 
at both levels. However, when the relationship between two variables is the same at different 
levels, this indicates that similar constructs and processes operate at these levels (Steel & 
Ones, 2002). Hence, the present results suggest that processes underlying the relationship 
between threat and right-wing attitudes are the same at the individual and the national level. It 
might, however, be recommendable to conduct multilevel analysis, including not only 
country-level threat indicators, but also experienced threat at the individual level. Such a 
design would allow to examine the relationship between individual level threat and right-wing 
attitudes, while statistically modeling the national level. It should be stressed, however, that 
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these ideas require testing individual-level threat items that are not included in the values 
surveys used in the present study. 
The present study also revealed an exponential relationship between threat and right-
wing attitudes. More specifically, it was revealed that at the high end of the threat continuum, 
right-wing attitudes increase to disproportionally high levels. In other words, very high levels 
of country-level threat may go together with a collective mindset that tends to shift to the (far) 
right. Historical observations indeed speak to this conclusion. The rise of Hitler in Germany, 
for instance, occurred during a period of severe recession and economic hardship. As the 
present results indicate, in the face of threat, the collective mind seems to be remarkably 
efficient in becoming authoritarian and potentially accepting autocratic leadership.  
Finally, our results also speak for the universal nature of the relationship between 
threat and right-wing attitudes. More specifically, the present relationship emerged using a 
worldwide sample, including countries from all continents.  However, it should be noted that 
the available survey data cannot be considered as fully exhaustive as they are limited by the 
possibility of personally questioning individuals within a specific country. The issue arising 
here is whether the present relationships between threat and right-wing attitudes would remain 
when including other, extremely threatening contexts, such as Afghanistan, Myanmar, and 
North Korea. 
In the remainder of this article, we discuss the interplay between national character 
and the psychology of the individual. We also discuss some of the strengths and limitations of 
our study. 
The interplay between individual and nation 
Rentfrow, Gosling, & Potter (2008) have developed a theoretical framework to 
understand the relationship between individuals and nations for variables that relate on the 
individual and national levels. Rentfrow and colleagues start with the straightforward 
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observation that in countries with higher mean levels of a trait, such as right-wing attitudes, 
there is an increased likelihood of finding people who score highly on this trait. Moreover, 
because attitudes are often expressed in behavior (e.g., Ajzen, 1991), there is an increased 
likelihood of right-wing expressions, like increased support for right-wing parties, in such 
countries. These common tendencies may become represented at the collective and 
institutional levels, such as the mental representation of the nation as a conservative country. 
These tendencies might even become institutional, as expressed, for example, by the presence 
of strict laws. According to Rentfrow and colleagues, such a context “could also affect 
individuals in the environment who score comparatively low on those traits” (p. 344). In other 
words, a right-wing climate may create a psychosocial environment that influences “the ways 
in which people in that region think, feel, and behave, even if those tendencies are contrary to 
their natural dispositions” (p. 344). Hence, the general shift towards the right-wing not only 
expresses itself in higher levels of right-wing attitudes among incumbents who already have 
right-wing attitudes, but also among those on the left-wing side.  
The application of Rentfrow and colleagues’ (2008) theory on mutual, reinforcing 
individual and national levels speaks to the context dependability of ideology and the 
flexibility of individuals and groups to shift their ideological attitudes in either direction. The 
idea that right-wing attitudes have the potential to influence the group level is certainly not 
new and some scholars have even described right-wing attitudes in terms of group processes. 
Authoritarianism, which is often considered a typical variable that taps into the social-cultural 
domain, has been repeatedly described in terms of adherence to ingroup norms (see, Duckitt, 
2001; Stellmacher & Petzel, 2005) and as a means to foster large scale cooperation (Kessler & 
Cohrs, 2008). Threat has also been reported to increase adherence to norms in small groups 
(Turner, Pratkanis, Probasco, & Leve, 1992), and the increase in right-wing attitudes might be 
interpreted as a large scale strategy of adhering to group norms in the face of collective threat. 
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Moreover, the finding that in threatened countries there is a collective tendency to accept 
economic-hierarchical right-wing attitudes, such as income inequality and increased 
competition, also aligns well with System Justification Theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994), which 
holds that under heightened system threat status, inequalities are better accepted. 
Strengths and limitations 
Our study has various strengths and limitations. A definite strength is the use of 
statistical threat indicators retrieved from reliable sources. By using these statistical threat 
indicators, item response biases were avoided.  Moreover, statistical measures are more 
comparable over countries than subjective perceptions of threat. Another strength of the 
present study is the use of country-level scores of right-wing attitudes based on well-
validated, high-quality questionnaires, administered in large, representative samples. 
Furthermore, due to the worldwide availability of Values Survey data and statistical threat 
indicators, we were able to include less developed countries.  
However, there are also methodological weaknesses to the present study. First, 
although we used well-validated questionnaires, cultural biases from linguistic or cultural 
differences may still have pervaded our study. However, if such biases do exist, they would 
add measurement error, thus potentially weakening the relationships between the constructs 
under study. In other words, cultural biases cannot explain the emergence of the present 
relationships. Moreover, we were restricted in the choice of items for the right-wing attitudes, 
as we had to rely on items already included in the WVS/EVS. Our set of objective threat 
indicators might seem somewhat limited, as some threat types previously investigated in 
relation to right-wing attitudes, such as outgroup threat, terrorist threat and threat to social 
cohesion, are not included. However, it is very difficult to find “objective” indicators for these 
types of threats.  
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Finally, because of the use of cross-sectional data in the present study, we cannot 
make claims about causality. Indeed, it might be that high national threat causes higher 
national levels of right-wing attitudes, or the other way around. In other words, threat may not 
only influence right-wing attitudes, but right-wing attitudes may also influence the perception 
of threat. Using cross-lagged analyses of longitudinal individual-level data, Sibley, Wilson 
and Duckitt (2007) indeed reported bidirectional effects between an indicator of threat (i.e., 
dangerous worldviews) and right-wing attitudes (i.e., RWA). Longitudinal research using a 
full cross-lagged design on the basis of country-level data would thus be needed to fully test 
causality.  
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Table 1. Correlation table 
 GDP Inflation Unemployment Homicide 
Rate 
Life 
expectancy 
Obedience  Authority  Incomes  Competition  
GDP  -.46
***
 -.52
***
 -.37
***
 .59
***
 -.47
***
 -.31
**
 -.27
**
 -.31
**
 
Inflation   .45
***
 .46
***
 -.52
***
 .41
***
 .25
*
 .11 .20
*
 
Unemployment    .38
***
 -.64
***
 .46
***
 .33
***
 .16 .35
***
 
Homicide Rate     -.52
***
 .43
***
 .34
***
 .23
*
 .15 
Life expectancy      -.58
***
 -.28
**
 -.33
***
 -.26
*
 
Obedience        .47
***
 .35
***
 .32
**
 
Authority         .16 .20
*
 
Incomes          .20
*
 
Competition           
 
Note. The correlations between the indicators of threat and the indicators for social-cultural and economic-hierarchical right-wing attitudes  
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.  
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Figure 1. Model of the relationships between threat and the right-wing attitudes (with 
standardized path coefficients) 
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Figure 2a. Relationship between levels of threat (X-axis) and social-cultural right-wing attitudes (Y-axis), with a fit line for the linear relationship (full line) 
and the exponential relationship (dotted line) . The full country names can be found in the appendix 
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Figure 2b. Relationship between levels of threat (X-axis) and economic-hierarchical right-wing attitudes (Y-axis), with a fit line for the linear relationship (full 
line) and the exponential relationship (dotted line). The full country names can be found in the appendix 
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Figure 3a. Levels of social-cultural right-wing attitudes in the world 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3b. Levels of economic-hierarchical right-wing attitudes in the world 
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Appendix. 
Abbreviations of countries 
 
ALB      Albania  
 
HUN      Hungary  
 
RUS      Russia   
ALG      Algeria  
 
INDIA    India    
 
RWA      Rwanda   
AND      Andorra  
 
INDO     Indonesia SAF      South Africa 
ARG      Argentina IRAN     Iran     
 
SAU      Saudi Arabia 
ARM      Armenia  
 
IRAQ     Iraq     
 
SER      Serbia   
ASL      Australia 
 
IRE      Ireland  
 
SIN      Singapora 
AUS      Austria  
 
ISR      Israel   
 
SLOK     Slovak Republic 
AZE      Azerbaijan ITA      Italy    
 
SLOV     Slovenia 
BAN      Bangladesh JAP      Japan    
 
SPA      Spain    
BELA     Belarus  
 
JOR      Jordan   
 
SWE      Sweden   
BELG     Belgium  
 
KYR      Kyrgyz Republic   SWI      Switzerland 
BOS      Bosnia   
 
LAT      Latvia   
 
TAI      Taiwan   
BRA      Brazil   
 
LIT      Lithuania 
 
TAN      Tanzania 
BUL      Bulgaria 
 
LUX      Luxembourg THA      Thailand 
BUR      Burkina Faso MAC      Macedonia TRI      Trinidad & Tobago 
CAN      Canada   
 
MAL      Malaysia 
 
TUR      Turkey   
CHIL Chile    
 
MAL      Malta    
 
UGA      Uganda   
CHINA    China    
 
MALI     Mali     
 
UK       United Kingdom 
COL      Colombia 
 
MEX      Mexico   
 
UKR      Ukraine  
CYP      Cyprus   
 
MOL      Moldova  
 
URU      Uruguay  
CZE      Czech Republic MON      Montenego USA      United States of America      
DEN      Denmark  
 
MOR      Morocco  
 
VEN      Venezuela 
EGY      Egypt    
 
NETH     Netherlands VIE      Vietnam  
EST      Estonia  
 
NEW      New Zealand ZAM      Zambia   
ETH      Ethiopia 
 
NIG      Nigeria  
 
ZIM      Zimbabwe 
FIN      Finland  
 
NOR      Norway   
   FRA      France   
 
PAK      Pakistan 
   GEO      Georgia  
 
PER      Peru     
   GER      Germany  
 
PHI      Philippines 
  GHA      Ghana    
 
POL      Poland   
   GRE      Greece   
 
POR      Portugal 
   GUA      Guatemala PUE      Puerto Rico 
  
HOKO     Hong Kong ROM      Romania  
    
 
